An Obligation Imposed by the »Arab Spring« and the Israel–Iran Conflict

With the war drums on Iran sounding again and the Arab Revolts following an arduous path, the question of a sustainable perspective for a conflict-ridden region remains to be dealt with. After all, the lack of both security and cooperation is an enduring malady plaguing the region.

Civil-society effort towards common security and regional cooperation

Some years ago a civil-society initiative for a Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (CSCME) was spearheaded in Germany by peace and conflict researcher Prof. Mohssen Massarrat in collaboration with the German branches of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) and the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA). After decades of violent conflicts in the region, the initiators chose not to sit down and wait anymore, but decided to assemble civil-society actors from all countries concerned in order to promote a perspective for peace, security and cooperation – something state actors have carelessly neglected. One of its key aims is the creation of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).

After a first workshop held in Germany in January 2011, a second took place by late October at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London in cooperation with its Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy (CISD). The meeting was linked to an annual CISD conference on a related subject, the 6th SOAS/British Pugwash London Conference on a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone.

So far civil-society forces from almost all countries of the region have been brought together. Unified in the desire to break out from the vicious cycle of regional militarization, they want to offer a vision for common security and regional cooperation. In addition to security policy, the CSCME process comprises a number of fields for cooperation, among others in the areas of socio-economic development, cross-border resource management, inter-religious and -cultural dialogue, and health. It is hoped that the next expert conference will take place in the region itself. All of that in view of holding a founding conference for the civil-society CSCME process in the near future.

For 2012 (perhaps more realistically for 2013), the first United Nations Middle East WMD-Free Zone Conference is planned, for which Finland has been chosen as host. Ideally, concrete steps towards the realization of that aim would be defined there and civil-society groups involved.

The “Arab Spring”: The necessity of a veritable regional security architecture

An important topic of the last workshop in London was the “Arab Spring” which demonstrated that the pejoratively dismissed “Arab Street” is not a passive object for authoritarian rule, but that societies can offensively fight for their own needs and interests, and eventually bring about change. This development has emboldened the initiative for a CSCME as it showed that civil-society pressure can indeed yield tangible results.

Importantly, if we comprehend the revolutionary process in the Arab world to be motivated by a triad of popular demands, namely the pursuit of socio-economic justice, political freedoms, and independence, what is intimately connected to the latter is the question of security, especially for those countries so far over-dependent on non-regional powers.

The Iran–Israel conundrum: A WMD-free zone as the only sustainable solution

Beyond that implicit demand inherent to the Arab uprisings for security and coexistence, there is another front which propels us to contemplate about new paths and solutions. The seemingly never-ending spectacle around the so-called Iran nuclear conflict, which is more often tilting towards war than a peaceful resolution, has again produced heated debates on its whereabouts. With the bulk of the policy debates endlessly vacillating between a rock (war) and a hard place (sanctions), it is clear that both options will not alleviate concerns for both nuclear proliferation and the Iranian civil society’s well-being. The only meaningful way forward would be to abandon such a bogus policy alternative which has proven counterproductive and will only push the conflict towards the brink of war, and instead striving for regional disarmament and eventually a WMD-free zone. In order to avoid a collision resulting from contentions over nuclear monopoly and deterrence, the creation of such a zone would arguably constitute the only meaningful exit. Hence, the desire to bring both Iran and Israel to the table at the above mentioned UN conference.

While there can be little doubt that civil societies across the region are in need of a prospect for common security and intra-regional cooperation, there can be no less doubt that the so-far preferred policies affecting the region have proven unsuccessful at best. Only in an overall Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (CSCME) can the concatenation of multi-faceted conflicts in the region be addressed in a sustainable manner. Here, the continuing and increasing insistence from diverse civil society actors will be indispensable to encourage policy-makers to pave the way for bringing sustainable peace and security to the region.

SOURCE

Ali Fathollah-Nejad (2011) “A Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East“, Fair Observer, 2 December;

▪ slightly edited version published as “Security and Cooperation in the Middle East: Searching for a Solution“, openDemocracy,  1 December;

▪ published as “WMD Free Zone: Avoiding a Collision Over Nuclear Monopoly and Deterrence“, Iranian.com, 8 December;

▪ published as “A Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East: An Obligation Imposed by the “Arab Spring” and the Israel–Iran Conflict“, Payvand Iran News, 9 December;

▪ published as “A Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East: An Obligation Imposed by the Arab Spring and the Israel–Iran Conflict“, Foreign Policy Journal, 9 December ;

▪ published as “A Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East: An Obligation Imposed by the Arab Spring and the Israel–Iran Conflict“, Iran Review, 9 December;

▪ published as “A Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East“, Atlantic Community, Berlin: Atlantische Initiative, 19 January;

▪ republished on Yahanestán: opinión y sociedad sobre Oriente Medio (Mexico), 21 January 2012.

Sanktionen, ob wirtschaftlicher und/oder politischer Natur, gelten als Instrument zur Erwirkung von Zugeständnissen beim politischen Opponenten. Zumeist wird versucht, dieses Ziel dadurch zu erreichen, dass dem sanktionierten Staat oder der jeweiligen tonangebenden Machtelite das Einkommen beschnitten wird. Um eben jenen Kurswechsel beim Adressaten herbeizuführen, werden Sanktionen im politischen Diskurs zudem als nachgerade gewaltloses, friedliches Mittel dargestellt. In Bezug auf Iran werden gegenwärtig folgende Ziele, die durch Sanktionen zu erreichen seien, proklamiert: Iran soll zu Zugeständnissen zu Gunsten der USA bzw. des Westens gezwungen werden, v.a. im Nuklearstreit, potentiell aber auch bei politischen Fragen in Südwestasien; Irans Atomwaffenfähigkeit soll verhindert werden; die iranische Führung soll geschwächt und die Zivilgesellschaft gestärkt werden.

[...]

QUELLE

Fathollah-Nejad, Ali (2010) “Sanktionsregime gegen den Iran: Entstehung und Auswirkungen” [The Sanctions Regime on Iran: Its Formation and Impacts], inamo: Berichte und Analysen zu Politik und Gesellschaft des Nahen und Mittleren Ostens, Berlin: Informationsprojekt Naher und Mittlerer Osten (inamo), Jg. 16, Nr. 63 (Herbst), S. 33–39.

For the English version, please scroll down.

»Arabischer Frühling« zeigt: Druck der Zivilgesellschaft wirkt

Ali Fathollah-Nejad von der School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) der Universität London ist Mitglied der Initiative für eine Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit im Mittleren und Nahen Osten (KSZMNO). Ein Hauptziel ist die Schaffung einer kernwaffenfreien Zone. Mit dem Politologen sprach für »nd« Thomas Kachel.

ND: Die KSZMNO ist eine Initiative für die Beförderung des Friedens in Nahmittelost durch zivilgesellschaftliche Akteure. Wie kam es dazu?

Fathollah-Nejad: Die Initiative wurde in Deutschland schon vor einigen Jahren vom Friedensforscher Mohssen Massarrat gemeinsam mit den deutschen Sektionen der IPPNW (Ärzte gegen den Atomkrieg) und IALANA (Rechtsanwälte gegen den Atomkrieg) angestoßen. Nach Jahrzehnten gewaltsamer Konflikte in der Region wollten die Initiatoren nicht länger warten und beschlossen, zivilgesellschaftliche Akteure aus allen betroffenen Ländern zusammenzuführen, um eine Perspektive in Frieden, Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit zu fördern – was die staatlichen Akteure bislang sträflich vernachlässigt haben. Nach einer ersten Tagung im Januar fand kürzlich an der Londoner SOAS eine zweite statt.

Wer nimmt daran teil und worin besteht ihr nächstes konkretes Ziel?

Wir haben bisher zivilgesellschaftliche Kräfte aus nahezu allen Ländern der Region versammeln können. Sie alle eint der Wunsch, aus dem Teufelskreis gegenseitiger rüstungsbasierter Abschreckung auszubrechen und stattdessen eine regionale Zusammenarbeit zu erreichen. Der KSZMNO-Prozess umfasst neben der Sicherheitspolitik eine Reihe weiterer Kooperationsfelder, unter anderem in den Bereichen sozio-ökonomische Entwicklung, grenzübergreifendes Ressourcenmanagement, interkultureller und interreligiöser Dialog und Gesundheit. Wir hoffen, dass die nächste Fachtagung in der Region selbst stattfindet. All dies mit der Aussicht, in naher Zukunft eine Gründungskonferenz des zivilgesellschaftlichen KSZMNO-Prozesses zu veranstalten.

Für 2012 ist eine erste UN-Konferenz zur Schaffung einer von Massenvernichtungswaffen freien Zone in Nahmittelost geplant. Wir wünschten, dass dort exakte Schritte zur Realisierung dieses Ziels bestimmt und zivilgesellschaftliche Gruppen einbezogen würden.

Was stand im Mittelpunkt der jüngsten Tagung?

Wichtigstes Thema war der »Arabische Frühling«, der gezeigt hat, dass die abwertend als »arabische Straße« abgetanen Gesellschaften nicht etwa passive Objekte autoritärer Herrschaft sind, sondern als Zivilgesellschaft offensiv für ihre Belange eintreten können. Diese Entwicklung gibt auch unserer Initiative Rückenwind, zumal deutlich wird, dass zivilgesellschaftlicher Druck fruchten kann.

Besorgnis rief vor dem Hintergrund des sogenannten Nuklearstreits ein etwaiger israelischer Angriff auf Iran hervor – ein Thema, das momentan wieder Schlagzeilen macht. Daher auch der Wunsch, beide Parteien im Rahmen der genannten UN-Konferenz an einen Tisch zu bekommen.

Im Westen werden Mahnungen zum friedlichen Umgang mit Iran oft gleichgesetzt mit Parteinahme für Mahmud Ahmadinedschad.

Ich denke, dass solch eine abenteuerliche Behauptung längst ihr Verfallsdatum erreicht hat. Friedliches und faires, am Völkerrecht orientiertes Handeln bedeutet ja nicht »Appeasement«, wie die Neokonservativen behaupten. Denn Fakt ist, dass Wirtschaftssanktionen und Kriegsdrohungen – also das Ausbleiben einer Konfliktlösung – der Zivilgesellschaft enorm geschadet haben, während die gegenwärtige Machtkonfiguration zementiert wurde. Vielmehr verspricht eine Kurskorrektur die Schwächung der Hardliner auf allen Seiten.

QUELLE

Fathollah-Nejad, Ali (2011) Eine KSZE für den Nahen Osten? »Arabischer Frühling« zeigt: Druck der Zivilgesellschaft wirkt, Interview durch Thomas Kachel, Neues Deutschland, 8. November, S. 8;

▪ wiederveröffentlicht auf ZNet Deutschland, 9. November.

 

* * * * *

A Conference for Security and Cooperation for the Middle East?

»Arab Spring« demonstrates that civil-society yields results

Ali Fathollah-Nejad from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) of the University of London is member of the initiative for a civil-society Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (CSCME). One of its key aims is the creation of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. Thomas Kachel spoke to the political scientist.

The CSCME is an initiative for the promotion of peace in the Middle East through civil-society actors. How did it come about?

The initiative was spearheaded some years ago in Germany by peace researcher Mohssen Massarrat in collaboration with the German branches of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) and the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA). After decades of violent conflicts in the region, the initiators chose not to sit down and wait anymore, rather decided to assemble civil-society actors from all countries concerned in order to promote the perspective for peace, security and cooperation – something state actors have carelessly neglected so far. After a first workshop in January, a second one has been held at SOAS in London by late October.

Who are the participants and what are their next concrete goals?

So far we have been able to bring together civil-society forces from almost all countries of the region. They are unified in the desire to break out from the vicious cycle of armament-based deterrence and instead bring about regional cooperation. In addition to security policy, the CSCME process comprises a number of fields for cooperation, among others in the areas socio-economic development, cross-border resource management, inter-religious and -cultural dialogue, and health. We hope that the next expert conference will be taking place in the region itself. All of that in view of holding a founding conference for the civil-society CSCME process in the near future.

For 2012, the first United Nations Middle East WMD-Free Zone Conference is planned. Our desire is that concrete steps towards the realization of that aim will be defined and civil-society groups involved.

What has been the focus of the recent workshop?

The most important topic was the “Arab Spring” which showed that the pejoratively dismissed “Arab Street” is not a passive object of authoritarian rule, but that civil societies can offensively fight for their own needs and interests. This development has also emboldened our initiative as it demonstrates that civil-society pressure can yield results.

Against the background of the so-called nuclear crisis, a potential Israeli attack on Iran raised concerns – a subject now again in the headlines. Hence, the desire to bring both parties to the table in the framework of the said UN conference.

In the West, appeals for a peaceful approach towards Iran are often equated with partisanship for Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

I believe such an adventurous claim has long exceeded its expiry date. A peaceful and fair approach, respecting international law, can of course not be put on the same level as “appeasement” as assumed by neoconservatives. The fact of the matter is that economic sanctions and the threat of war – in other words, the lack of conflict resolution – have enormously damaged civil society, while the current power configuration has been cemented. In fact, reversing such a course of action promises to weaken hardliners on all sides.

SOURCE

Fathollah-Nejad, Ali (2011) “A New Security Architecture for the Middle East?“, Fair Observer, 13 December;

▪ also published as “A Conference for Security and Cooperation for the Middle East?“, Monthly Review Webzine, 15 December;

▪ republished on Europe’s World, 24 December.

[Translation from "Eine KSZE für den Nahen Osten? »Arabischer Frühling« zeigt: Druck der Zivilgesellschaft wirkt", Interview by Thomas Kachel, Neues Deutschland (Germany), 8 November 2011, p. 8.]

Der vorliegende Artikel befasst sich mit (1.) der tiefreichenden Verflechtung von Religion und Staat in Iran sowie (2.) der Entstehung einer schiitischen Theokratie sowohl als Ergebnis eines Zusammenstoßes von internen (d.h. politischen, ideologischen, sozialen und ökonomischen) und externen (Imperialismus) Strukturen als auch von kurzfristig zurückliegenden kontingenten historischen Umständen.

[...]

QUELLE

Fathollah-Nejad, Ali & Yazdani, Kaveh (2011) “Das Verhältnis von Religion und Staat in Iran: Von den Safaviden bis heute” [The Relationship between Religion and State in Iran: From the Safavids until Today], Zeitschrift für Religion und Gesellschaft, Köln: Forschungszentrum für Religion und Gesellschaft (forege), Jg. 1, Nr. 2 (Herbst), S. 298–312.

[Die Zeitschrift ist hier zu beziehen.]

REAKTIONEN

Die mit dem Düsseldorfer Friedenspreis 2010 ausgezeichnete FriedensTreiberAgentur (FTA) berichtet in ihrem Newsletter Nr. 270/2011 (03.11.2011) von diesem Artikel.

Seit knapp einem Jahrzehnt stellt der sog. Iran-Konflikt einen der prominentesten globalen Brennpunkte dar. Oft ist verkürzt die Rede vom Atomstreit, also dem Vorwurf, Iran strebe unter dem Deckmantel eines zivilen Atomprogramms die Entwicklung von Kernwaffen an. In der westlichen Wahrnehmung sind die westlichen Akteure auf der Seite des Völkerrechtes und versuchen dieses gegen einen nicht zur Vernunft zu bringenden iranischen Akteur
durchzusetzen.

Der vorliegende Beitrag diskutiert die Frage nach dem Völkerrecht in Bezug auf die historischen Erfahrungen Irans mit dem Völkerrecht und dem UN-Sicherheitsrat (Teil I), die Iran einen besonderen Platz einräumende US-Weltpolitik am Anfang der 21. Jahrhunderts (Teil II), den „Atomstreit“ und die ihn begleitende diplomatische Strategie der vor allem transatlantischen Großmächte (Teil III), sowie zuletzt die „Überweisung“ des iranischen Nukleardossiers von der Internationalen Atomenergie-Agentur (IAEA) an den UN-Sicherheitsrat (UNSR) (Teil IV). Generell soll im Folgenden geprüft werden, ob bei dem internationalen Konflikt um Iran das Völkerrecht als Mittel der Zivilisierung Internationaler Beziehungen respektiert wird und ob dessen zentrale Vorschriften beachtet werden.

[...]

SOURCE

Ali Fathollah-Nejad (2011) “Der internationale Konflikt um Iran und das Völkerrecht” [The International Iran Conflict and International Law], in: Crome, Erhard (ed.) Die UNO und das Völkerrecht in den internationalen Beziehungen der Gegenwart [The UN and International Law in Today’s International Relations], Berlin: Rosa Luxemburg Foundation (RLS Papers), pp. 67–93.

Ali Fathollah-Nejad puts the Iran policy of Barack Obama in perspective by also discussing the ideas of U.S. think-tanks and George W. Bush. He elaborates on his book The Iran Conflict and the Obama Administration: Old Wine in New Skins? [in German], Potsdam University Press, 2010 & 2011 (reprint).

Praise for the book include:

“A detailed and utterly persuasive indictment of US policy towards Iran.”

Dr. Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London, author of Iran in World Politics: The Question of the Islamic Republic, Hurst 2007 and Columbia University Press 2008;

“[…] read with applause. A very thorough and succinct work. […] nothing important left out.”

Rudolph Chimelli, veteran journalist and Iran expert, Süddeutsche Zeitung (Germany largest daily newspaper).

U.S. policy towards Iran under George W. Bush

What were the main features of the Iran policy of U.S. President George W. Bush?

As we all know, the U.S. policy vis-à-vis Iran was marked by a highly confrontational attitude. The very fact that the Bush/Cheney administration decided to “thank” the Iranian government for its crucial assistance in toppling the Taliban regime in Afghanistan by autumn 2001, by naming Iran as part of an “axis of evil” in Bush’s State of the Union address in early 2002, has been a clear indication of the approach preferred towards Iran.

During the Bush II years (but already starting under the Clinton administration), there was tremendous pressure by neoconservative groups outside and inside the administration to effect a “regime change” in Tehran, even to the extent to ask the intelligence services to fabricate evidence for the alleged Iranian “nuclear threat” – stark efforts of political manipulation whose shadows still bear upon the current ties of those institutions as Seymour Hersh describes in his most recent piece on Iran policy for The New Yorker.

The neoconservatives who have been occupying the corridors of power in the first Bush II administration had been able to push through their ideas on how to cope with the Iran problem. These were centred around the principle of not talking to a “rogue state” (which in fact was the basis for the total dismissal of Iran’s “grand bargain” offer in the wake of the U.S.-led invasion o Iraq in spring 2003); an imperial posture that sought to impose a Diktat on Tehran on various topics ranging from the nuclear issue (encapsulated in the legally highly problematic and unrealistic demand for Iran to completely halt its nuclear programme) to regional ones (especially in the U.S. war theatres in Iraq and Afghanistan).

It was already during the second mandate of the Bush/Cheney administration that there was an awakening in some U.S. policy circles about the strategic deficiencies of the confrontational, if not belligerent, approach by Washington not only in the Iran question, but also in other theatres across West Asia. After all, the neoconservative-pushed invasions of Afghanistan (in October 2001) and Iraq (in March 2003) had eliminated Tehran’s immediate foes and thus paved the way for Iran’s increasing regional influence, particularly in post-Saddam Iraq and post-Taliban Afghanistan. Together with the deepening of the “Iraqi quagmire” – not least a result of the strength of the resistance there against the U.S.-led occupation –, by the mid-2000s Iran attained the status of an “indispensable nation” for any kind of strategic arrangements in the region – something the neo-cons in their obsession to aggressively confront Iran had been paradoxically the very enablers thereof. Of course, in the run-up to the war on Iraq, many U.S. Realists had warned about the geopolitical consequences of those invasions, but had been quite ignored.

Finally, the Realist camp’s comeback came with the December 2006 so-called Baker–Hamilton report, which being the first acknowledgement of U.S. policy failures in Iraq and beyond recommended a new approach involving diplomatic openings towards the formerly designated “rogue states” Iran and Syria in the effort to improve the U.S. status in the region.

In other words, before George W. Bush left office, it was clear that his administration’s neoconservative-influenced “don’t talk to Iran” stance has not been producing the desired results. Not only was Iran able – even enabled – to increase its regional standing, but its nuclear programme despite heavy pressures was not halted either. In the 2008 U.S. presidential elections, many presidential candidates tried to capitalize on that failure, among them Barack Obama who on some occasions talked about a new Iran policy approach, thus raising hopes of overcoming his predecessor’s sabre-rattling posture which pushed the world to the brink of another catastrophic war in that region.

However, it is too easily forgotten that the Bush/Cheney administration’s military offensive in the region had in fact enabled the U.S. to establish large, permanent military bases to the immediate east and west of Iran (but of course also in the “Greater Middle East”, in Afghanistan and Central Asia with a view on China), thus making Iran’s military encirclement by the U.S. complete. This situation, including the increasing militarization of the Persian Gulf, to this day nourishes Tehran’s sense of strategic insecurity.

Thus, in a nutshell, the best notion to describe George W. Bush’s Iran policy is “coercive diplomacy”, a term borrowed from Diplomatic Studies, which signals a policy that majorly relies on punitive measures (economic sanctions, political and military pressures) to force concessions from the other side. As such, the coercive strategy totally perverts the notion of diplomacy which only when exercised in “good faith” can bring about satisfying results to the parties involved.

Needless to say that legally this “coercive” approach is highly problematic – to say the least. Not only has the constant threat of war (being a clear violation of the UN Charter which in its Article 2(4) states that “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state [...]”) been an indispensable feature of the “coercive diplomacy” or “strategy”, but the covert operations in Iran, including acts of sabotage and targeted assassinations to put a brake on the nuclear programme need also mentioning, not least because they still go on.

Policy recommendations regarding Iran by U.S. think-tanks

What policy recommendations have leading think-tanks made regarding Iran?

Against that background, the chance of an Obama Administration formulating a much more even-handed approach towards Iran was the key question, also given the proclaimed need for a “course correction”. I hence studied the various policy recommendation papers being prepared by old and also newly found think-tanks on the Iran question in the transition period between the Bush II and Obama administrations. Here I tried to identify the most important U.S. think-tanks on Iran and wider Middle East issues, and categorize their recommendations, which led me to list them under the following rubrics:

(1) Neoconservatives and liberal hawks favoured the continuation of the “coercive strategy”. This group which among others include the U.S. “Israel Lobby”, with its think-tank The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), and the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC), has de facto been advocating a “roadmap to war” – aptly described by Jim Lobe –, based on the motto of capitulation or war. Still making alarmist assumptions about the Iranian “nuclear threat” and Tehran’s foreign policy goals in general, they still insist that Iran give up nuclear enrichment within an ultimatum, whose ultimate aim would be to legitimize in the eyes of the public the recourse to war. The logic here is very simple: By making unrealistic demands, the failure of any negotiations is wilfully anticipated, which then, according to the BPC, shall open the way for illegal measures such as an economic blockade and a military attack.

WINEP’s Patrick Clawson has summarized the rationale of such an approach as follows: “The principal target with these offers [to Iran] is not Iran. [...] The principal target of these offers is American public opinion and world public opinion.” In this context Dennis Ross plays a key role as he has been actively involved in, if not at the forefront of, many Iran policy papers. Ross who is known for his advocacy for Israeli interests in Mideast “peace process” negotiations during the Clinton administration, was in February 2009 first appointed “Special Advisor for the [Persian] Gulf and Southwest Asia” for Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, then only four months later joined the National Security Council staff as a Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for the “Central Region” (including the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, Pakistan and South Asia): Applied to the policy on Iran, his concept of “smart statecraft” stresses the need for “more carrots and more sticks”, very much echoing the approach preferred during the Bush II years, with the “carrots” remaining unspecified, while the “sticks” are being fully deployed. Of course, the Saudi lobby and the wider military-industrial complex ought to be located in this category as well, plus a considerable part of Obama’s administration, including UN Ambassador Susan Rice.

(2) The mainstream élite think-tanks (above all, the Brookings Institution, the Council on Foreign Relations and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) argued for a more (but not exclusively) Realpolitik-based strategy in order to serve U.S. interests in the region, which they believe have not been pursued adequately. They warn against a blind repetition of Bush’s Iran policy which they see as having failed. Instead the U.S. should be ready for engagement with Iran, knowing that this will be time-consuming and arduous. Generally, it is stressed that Iran could be contained, even as a nuclear state.

However, within these “centrist” circles there is a wide range of opinions, even including the “unattractive option” of a preventive strike on Iran, as formulated in an article in CFR’s Foreign Affairs by the Council’s President Richard Haass and the Director of Brookings’ Saban Center for Middle East Policy Martin Indyk.

(3) Moderate circles called for a whole new Iran policy embracing real diplomacy that would also take Iranian security and other interests into account. Countering existing myths about Iranian foreign-policy behaviour (especially when it comes to question of rationality in Tehran’s actions), they make the case for a serious diplomacy and a sustainable engagement with Iran. This group involves many Iran experts and long-standing U.S. diplomats (who e.g. gathered in the American Foreign Policy Project). Indeed they have drawn the right lessons of decades of misleading U.S. policy towards Iran and offer a viable strategy for the future.

U.S. policy towards Iran under Barack Obama

To what extent is President Barack Obama’s Iran policy in line with his predecessor’s policy and the advice of think-tanks?

The conclusion of my study was that it was unlikely to see a change in Washington’s Iran policy under Obama, mainly for the following reasons:

(1) Those advocating the continuation, even deepening of Bush’s “coercive strategy” were clearly very much present. During the Bush II years, neoconservative policy-advising circles had been firmly anchored in the policy debates, foremost when it came to the Iran question – an obsession they shared with the U.S. and Israeli governments – where they had acquired some expertise, albeit a very biased one. This sort of institutionalization in the policy-advising sphere has not disappeared with the new administration. In fact, most neocons and “liberal hawks” approved of Obama’s designations being a proof of his sense for “continuity”, as he not only chose the incumbent Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and his hawkish Democratic Party rival Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State (who during the presidential campaign had promised “tough diplomacy” towards Iran), but he also took over Stuart Levey in the Treasury Department, the man who since 2004 had been in charge of firmly internationalizing the sanctions regime, especially in the field of financial sanctions.

(2) The domestic blockade in the U.S. for a change in the Iran policy still remains intact and is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Of course, fundamental changes to the detriment of U.S. interests, above all a success of the Egyptian revolution or change within Saudi Arabia might trigger a radical new strategic thinking in Washington, which might be in line with what Stephen Kinzer is arguing in his Reset: Iran, Turkey, and America’s Future (New York: Times Books, 2010), i.e. a strategic reorientation of the U.S. towards Turkey and Iran, and to the detriment of Israel and Saudi Arabia. However, we are not likely to see the latter happening anytime soon, as the Israel Lobby, the military-industrial complex and the Saudi Lobby are all powerful and interconnected politico-economic alliances fighting any prospects for a U.S.–Iranian rapprochement, and more generally favouring a continuation of militaristic policies in the region.

As to how far Obama’s Iran policy is in line with the advice of think-tanks as discussed above, we can foremost mention the still dominant belief in the U.S. – shared by most think-tanks – that Iran must halt its nuclear programme and be deprived of nuclear material for building a bomb. When the nuclear talks were resumed by autumn 2009 around the issue of providing the Tehran Research Reactor with the needed 20% enriched uranium for medical purposes, such a stance informed Washington’s strategy aimed at preventing an Iranian nuclear break-out capability. This goal then failed in the face of Tehran’s insistence on a simultaneous swap of its low-enriched uranium (LEU) against that higher enriched one. In brief, the talks ultimately failed as a result of Washington’s miscalculated assumption that it could strike a deal which would ship the bulk of Iran’s nuclear material – in fact Tehran’s bargaining chip in its talks with great powers – outside the country.

(3) The more general point is the continuing reliance on the “coercive strategy” – or in the language of major powers, the “dual-track approach” – which is still heavily based on the imposition of punitive measures, above all economic and financial sanctions, in the case Iran does not comply with long-established demands such as the halt of the nuclear programme. Now with Russia and China also benefitting from the sanctions regime against Iran, the continuation of that strategy is being favoured. This was starkly witnessed in the negative reactions by all the UN veto powers to the Brazil- and Turkey-brokered deal with Iran on 17 May 2010, basically pointing out that the Iran issue had to be dealt with within the UN Security Council. Three weeks later, the latest round of tightened UN sanctions was imposed on Iran. Hence, for now we are still inside the vicious circle inherent to the “coercive strategy”, in which it seems more and more actors are finding their niches to profit from.

As a result, by June 2010, the Iran expert of the Council on Foreign Relations, Ray Takeyh, observed that “[...] the strategy has shifted from conciliation to coercion.” Given the improbability of that strategy to succeed, I think it is high time for the West to contemplate about an Iran policy beyond sanctions, which has not only cemented the positions of hardliners on all sides, but also block any advancement in the diplomatic stand-off and on wider regional issues of crucial importance to all parties involved.

SOURCE

Ali Fathollah-Nejad (2011) “U.S. Policy on Iran under Bush II and Obama”, Interview by Leonhardt van Efferink (Editor of ExploringGeopolitics), published on :

▪ Iran Review, 20 September;

▪ Global Research, Montreal: Centre for Research on Globalization, as “From Bush to Obama: US Policy Towards Iran“, 20 September;

▪ Iranian Diplomacy, as “Iran: Barack Obama, Encirclement, Dual-Track Approach“, 25 September.

REACTIONS

Safdari, Cyrus (2011) “US Policy on Iran: The Truth is Emerging“, Iran Affairs: Iranian Foreign Policy and International Affairs, 5 October.

The Iranian Revolution of 1979 is considered a defining moment because the Islamic Republic replaced an authoritarian monarchy that was friendly to the West. The revolution, moreover, linked religion to politics in an unprecedented way. Books by Hamid Dabashi, Elaheh Rostami-Povey and Arshin Adib-Moghaddam discuss the country’s history and its influence beyond its own borders.

Arguably the most important reason for the international interest in Iran is its strategically pivotal geography. Like some of its Muslim neighbours, it has tremendous oil and gas reserves. For the United States, the revolution in Iran was nothing less than a geopolitical shock.

Revolutionary dynamics in the Arab World have recently rekindled the debate in the West on “political Islam”. To get a good understanding of the phenomenon, however, it is necessary to define it properly – which, so far, has hardly been done.

The issue is generally approached from two directions. The cultural-essentialist or Orientalistic school holds that Islam determines political, economic and social realities. Orientalists argue that the entire Muslim world is not only somehow monolithic, but even downright resistant to change. Samuel Huntington’s book “The clash of civilizations” is a prominent expression of such thinking. This school is not alone in emphasising religion as the single most important defining feature of society, Islamist fundamentalists say so too.

The competing school emphasises structural aspects that have evolved in history. Its analyses take a wide range of factors into account, namely socio-economic conditions, political trends, historical change, class conflict and revolutions.

The current Arab Spring has dealt the Orientalist school a severe blow, and may yet discredit it once and for all. Obviously, there is a widespread desire in Muslim societies for change, and the revolutionary motivation is not primarily rooted in faith. Rather, the desire for universal freedoms and social justice is making itself heard in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere.

The books about Iran discussed here do not belong to the Orientalist camp. Nonetheless, each author assesses the topic from a different angle.

Struggle for democracy

In “Iran: a people interrupted” (2007), Hamid Dabashi analyses nearly 200 years of history from the literary-intellectual and political perspectives. The author takes his readers on a trip through time, revisiting major historical events. With unparalleled eloquence, he argues that Iranians have been fighting for democracy and against “foreign and domestic tyranny” for more than a century. Dabashi says the anti-colonial Tobacco Revolt at the end of the 19th century, the Constitutional Revolution at the beginning of the 20th, the nationalisation of the oil sector under Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in the 1950s and the “Islamic Revolution” at the end of the 1970s were the most important steps in this process.

He disagrees with the notion of Iran being caught between tradition and modernity, calling it a “fabricated paradox”. Instead, he argues that since the 19th century an “anti-colonial modernity” marked by the struggle against both domestic and foreign oppression has defined Iranians’ emancipatory experience.

Dabashi traces three major ideological formations back to the multicultural, pluralistic Constitutional Revolution of the early 20th century: liberal-democratic nationalism, social-democratic socialism and theocratic Islamism. In his view, these three ideological formations do not necessarily clash. Rather, they all have their roots in the anti-colonial struggle and serve as catalysts for one other.

In the early 20th century, the idea of the modern nation-state with the notion of citizenship took shape, including both women and religious minorities, with relevant roles for a free press and intellectuals. However, it was never fully realised because of the repression of a series of Shah regimes which were allied to colonial and imperial powers. These ideals have yet to materialise.

Dabashi sees Shia Islam as inherently oppositional in its political focus. Accordingly, a dilemma arises when Shia clerics assume state power and get corrupted by it – which is what happened in the Islamic Republic.

Dabashi assesses the role of Shia religious leaders in the context of Iran’s political development. He makes a distinction between progressive clerics who oppose unjust rule and conservative ones who are closely connected to power or strive for it. In doing so, he shows that Shia clerics in Iran do not form a monolithic block. As is evident today, some important leaders sympathise with the democracy movement, and many are not pleased with the increasingly militaristic system that was set up in the name of religion.

A wide range of voices

In “Iran’s influence: a religious-political state and society in its region” (2010), Elaheh Rostami-Povey quotes a wide range of contemporary voices – journalists, refugees, expatriates and researchers from Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine and Egypt. She conducted her interviews with Muslim modernists, secular leftists, nationalists and feminists from 2007 to 2009. She shows that all of them demand democracy and liberty.

Her book is an encyclopaedic discussion of the political dynamics within the religious-political state of Iran. She shows that its internal contradictions have fostered the growth of a new democratic movement, which calls the regime, but not religion as such, into question.

At the same time, she demonstrates why the Iranian state’s foreign policy has found approval in the region where a majority of the public identifies with Iran’s stance against the USA, Israel and the “war on terror”. One reason for the popularity of criticism voiced by Tehran is that many Arab autocracies cooperate with Washington, and open debate has been impossible so far.

Rostami-Povey emphasises the wide range of manifestations of “political Islam”, each of which has to be considered in its specific historical and socio-political context. She writes that Islamists in Iran, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and its associated organisations or Hamas in Palestine are all quite different, and all are struggling with their own internal contradictions. However, all varieties of Islamism have one thing in common: they mobilise popular support by opposing imperialism and Zionism.

Rostami-Povey warns that the term “Islamic fundamentalism” prevents us from seeing the diversity of various Islamisms. As she puts it, “homogenisation and essentialism” make us blind to dynamics of change and thus promote Orientalism and Islamophobia. She argues that, ultimately, the West’s ongoing hostility towards Iran and Islamist movements only strengthens those conservative forces.

Arshin Adib-Moghaddam comes to similar conclusions in “Iran in world politics: the question of the Islamic Republic” (2007). He has worked up an intricate theory on the interaction between society, culture and state institutions. As he puts it, “counter-hegemonic utopias” – such as Marxism, Communism, Maoism and Islamism – radically changed Iran’s political culture in the 1960s. The revolution therefore pursued “utopian-romantic” ideals, which left their mark on the Islamic Republic’s institutionalised norms and still affect its approach to foreign policy.

He emphasises the constant possibility of change in the Islamic Republic as a result of an “active counterculture”. He shows that the picture US neo-conservatives paint of Iran is perverted and calls for “critical Iranian studies” which would pluralise the ways one sees Iran and dissect the international politics surrounding the country.

These three books by noted scholars lay the foundation for a better understanding of Iran and “political Islam”. They theoretically and empirically assess the context in its entire complexity. Without such comprehensive knowledge, Western understanding cannot add up to more than biased knee-jerk reactions. The books show that political trends do not come about in a vacuum, but rather are rooted in complex settings with domestic and foreign social, economic and political factors. The idea of a “monolithic Islam” is not only wrong – it is dangerous.

Books reviewed:

• Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, Iran in World Politics: The Question of the Islamic Republic, London: Hurst 2007 & New York: Columbia University Press 2008.
• Hamid Dabashi, Iran: A People Interrupted, New York: New Press 2007.
• Elaheh Rostami-Povey, Iran’s Influence: A Religious–Political State and Society in its Region, London & New York: Zed Books 2010.

SOURCE

Ali Fathollah-Nejad (2011) “New Insights Into the Islamic Republic of Iran“, Development and Cooperation (D+C), Bonn: Deutsche Gesellschaft für internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Society for International Cooperation, GIZ), Vol. 52, No. 5 (May), pp. 208–209.

▪ republished on Europe’s World, 22/05/2011;

▪ republished on Global Research, Montreal: Centre for Research on Globalization, 22/05/2011;

▪ republished on e-International Relations (e-IR), 22/02/2011;

▪ republished on Monthly Review Webzine, 23/05/2011;

▪ republished as Defining Moment on Iranian.com, 23/05/2011;

▪ republished on Atlantic-Community.org, 24/05/2011;

▪ republished on Humanitarian Texts: World-Wide Asian–Eurasian Human Rights Forum, 25/05/2011;

▪ republished on ZNet, 31/05/2011;

AUF DEUTSCH | “Neue Blicke auf die Islamische Republik Iran“, Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit (E+Z), Vol. 52, No. 5 (May), pp. 208–209;

▪ republished on ZNet Deutschland, 15/06/2011.

SLOVENČINA | “Čo je to politický islam?“, trans. Peter Nedoroščík, utopia, 01/07/2011.

ABSTRACT

The south-western part of the Asian continent, an area spanning from the Levant to the Hindu Kush and from the Caucasus to the Arabian Peninsula, is widely – in political, public and even academic discourses alike – referred to as the ‘Near and/or Middle East’. Such thetic denomination of that geographical space has been subjected to exogenous attributions based upon cultural, political and strategic considerations by colonial and imperial powers. Due to the interest-driven and hence arbitrary nature, its boundaries have constantly been altered in the colonial/imperial mind map. However superficial those outside markers are, they tend to shape the reality of that region – and thus to create a political geography. Through imperial incursions and on-going military presence the prescribed politico–strategic framework has imposed itself onto the region.
Beyond those representations, shared cultural values and historical experiences might provide a basis for an endogenously designed future, potentially able to overcome the partitions the region suffers from on multiple levels. Thus, besides tracing the changing ‘political geographies’, the paper proposes a realistic utopia. It aims to de-colonize the ‘Middle East’ through a critical history of the region and embraces a regionalization process. Thus it pro-actively engages with the challenges posed by the imperially designed past and present.

Read the whole document here (pdf).

SOURCE

Ali Fathollah-Nejad (2010) “The ‘Middle East’: From Past and Present Attributions to a Future Regional Identity?“, Polyvocia: SOAS Journal of Graduate Research, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London, Vol. 2 (March), pp. 3–20.

The interview with Giovanni Arrighi below was conducted on 12 November 2005, at the “Kapitalismus Reloaded” international conference held in Berlin.  It is published in English here today to commemorate the one-year anniversary of Arrighi’s death.

A. Fathollah-Nejad (AFN): Does the West have to fear China?

G. Arrighi (GA): I don’t think so.  I mean I think that there is no question that the Chinese are sincere when they say that they are for a peaceful ascent, that they are against hegemony. [. . .]  I think that’s also part of the Chinese tradition. [. . .]  On the basis of a very simple calculation, China has nothing to gain by being militarily aggressive and everything to lose.  The only thing it [the West -- AFN] has to fear is the redistribution of power, and there’s no reason why this should translate into an aggressive China.

AFN: What about the rest of the world?  Would it have a better outcome with a Far Eastern hegemony led by China?

GA: Well, the Chinese doesn’t want to talk about hegemony.  But let’s put it this way: I think that the rest of the world, particularly the South — but also the North — should be better off with a multipolar world, where economically there isn’t just one locomotive like the United States but there are more than one.  And at this moment, certainly in East Asia — including Japan — it is the Chinese who are driving the recovery and keeping the expansion going on.  So I think the rest of the world is probably better off.  But the qualification is that this would be more the case if the Chinese don’t imitate the energy-wasting and energy-consuming pattern of consumption of the West.  If they develop more or less a sort of energy-saving kind of techniques, then that would be the best.  Who knows!

AFN: The greatest obstacle to Far Eastern hegemony seems to be the absence of a Sino-Japanese partnership.  Is this realistic in the future?

GA: It’s very hard to tell.  I mean both the Chinese and the Japanese have always privileged a kind of alliance or relationship with the United States than one between each other.  But again, it depends on what the United States will do in the Far East. [. . .]  Japan will go along with an aggressive U.S. stance towards the continuing Chinese growth.  So it’s possible, but for now it’s not likely; maybe it can be more likely in the future.

AFN: What does the dispossessed South have to do to change its present situation?

GA: I think the most important thing is to create and strengthen South-South links.  They don’t need to de-link from the North, they just have to strengthen mutual links and go on operat[ing] — what they are already doing [. . .] more or less — and that will probably change the situation in the South.

AFN: Some say that now there are a lot of tensions among Western countries when it comes to imperialism.  Others say that imperialism is for the sake of stabilization of their joint world domination.  What is your favorite argument?

GA: I don’t think that they are any dangers of so-called inter-imperialist rivalries between the United States and Europe.  The question is really how Europe and the United States — jointly or separately — relate to the South and the East: whether they accommodate the emergence of new so-called poles and powers, or whether they want to keep things as they are.  Because that’s probably the most dangerous thing: the attempt to [. . .] prevent economic rise of China. [. . .]  This can only lead to military adventures worse than Iraq.

AFN: Thank you very much.

Giovanni Arrighi (7 July 1937 – 18 June 2009) was Professor of Sociology and Director of the Institute for Global Studies in Culture, Power and History at Johns Hopkins University.  Among his many publications are The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times; Chaos and Governance in the Modern World System (with Beverly J. Silver); The Resurgence of East Asia: 500, 150 And 50 Year Perspectives; Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-First Century; “Hegemony Unraveling-I”; and “Hegemony Unraveling-II.”

SOURCE

Ali Fathollah-Nejad (2010) “Interview with Giovanni Arrighi (Berlin, 2005)“, Monthly Review Webzine, 18 June.

PRAISE

»excellent« (Noam Chomsky)

For French and German versions, please scroll down.

Collateral Damages of Smart Sanctions on Iran

The prospects for democracy, socio-economic development, and conflict resolution will suffer if the West continues to rely on punitive measures

This time, the warmongers’ silly season found its apogée in U.S. neo-conservative Daniel Pipes’ advice to Obama to “bomb Iran,” which appeared shortly after Tony Blair, having outlined why he helped invade Iraq, remarked ominously, “We face the same problem about Iran today.” The Chilcot Inquiry in the United Kingdom on how the Iraq War was launched ironically coincided with a considerable military build-up in the Persian Gulf region. All this occurred amidst the continued struggle of Iran’s civil rights movement and proclamations of Western leaders to be in support of the latter’s efforts. But is there any evidence for this?

In contradistinction to war, sanctions are widely portrayed as necessary, almost healthy medicine to bring about change in the opponent’s policies. However, as the history of the West–Iran conflict proves, sanctions have rather the state of crisis alive than contributed to its resolution. Nonetheless, Western governments do not seem to have lost their dubious fascination for them.

As the call for “crippling sanctions” became morally questionable when last summer the impressive Green wave shook the streets of Tehran for fear of wrecking the same, today the benign sounding “smart” or “targeted” sanctions are on the tip of everyone’s tongue. Yet, a close look reveals a great deal of wishful thinking as to the effects of such sanctions.

Gigantic dimensions of “smart sanctions”

“Smart sanctions”, it is claimed, are a magic wand with which to decapitate evil. In the Iranian case, evil is being identified with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. Originally a defense organization erected to counter Iraqi aggression in the 1980s, the Guardians have developed into an expansive socio-politico-economic conglomerate which is believed to possess unrivalled economic and political power in today’s Islamic Republic.

As we are told, “smart sanctions” shall target the Guardians’ grip on the Iranian power structure. The much neglected difficulty here – though it is widely acknowledged that the bulk of Iranian economy is now in the hands of the Guardians – is that in the end millions of civilians connected to these wide-ranging sectors thought to be controlled by the Guardians will be affected. Seen in this light, the gigantic dimension of these alleged “smart sanctions” comes to the fore.

Moreover, so-called “crippling sanctions” that target petrol supply to Iran are still en route. In anticipation of those U.S. unilateral sanctions, the world’s largest insurance companies have announced their retreat from Iran. This concerns both the financial and shipping sectors, and affects petrol supplies to Iran which imports 40 percent of its needs. Also three giant oil traders ended supplies to Iran, which amounted to half of Tehran’s imports. Needless to say, such sanctions ultimately harm the population. To add, a complete implementation thereof – i.e. preventing Asian competitors to step in – would require a naval blockade which amounts to an act of war.

Crippling the ordinary population

As stressed by civil society figures and economists, the price of sanctions is being paid by the Iranian population at large. The Iranian economy – manufacturing, agriculture, bank and financial sectors etc. – has been hurt from almost three decades of sanctions. Even today, businesses cannot easily obtain much needed goods on the international market to continue production and must often pay above-standard prices. Moreover, the scientific community has faced discrimination in areas of research as has Iran’s technological advances been slowed down.

Reflecting the dangers sanctions pose to the Green Movement, last fall Mir-Hossein Mousavi stated: “We are opposed to any types of sanctions against our nation.” The same was recently uttered by his fellow opposition leader Mehdi Karroubi in an interview with Corriere della Serra.

Meanwhile a more fundamental problem remains – hardly acknowledged by many proponents who succumb to the adventurous illusion of having a say in the design and implementation of sanctions: They are mainly designed by the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), introduced to the U.S. Congress and finally implemented by the Treasury Department’s Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey – an AIPAC confidant. Along this process, the potential suffering by Iran’s civil society hardly plays a role.

Sanctions – either “crippling” or “smart” – ultimately harm ordinary citizens. “Smart sanctions” is as much of an oxymoron as “smart weapons” which supposedly by “surgical strikes” only take out evil components. Indeed, much as in the case of their militaristic brothers-in-sprit, in the end the “collateral damages” of “smart sanctions” remain dominant.

A futile political instrument in today’s world

More generally, in an increasingly multipolar globalized world, sanctions imposed upon energy-rich countries are basically futile as an effective policy tool. Too numerous are business-driven actors that are only too happy to jump in. Thus, Chinese, Russian, and even U.S. companies (acting via Dubai) have hugely benefitted from the European, U.S.-pressured withdrawal from the Iranian market.

Thus, sanctions – a medicine with which Western policy-circles are so obsessed with – are not a cure but a slow poison applied to the civil society and thus the civil rights movement. Sanctions as prototype of economic warfare in concert with the seasonal flaring-up of war-mongering are a dangerous mix. The deafening “drums of war” continue to bang upon the beating heart of Iran’s civil society.

Sanctions and threats of war: Poisonous for democratic development

All this suggests that sanctions are perhaps a fig leaf for other agendas. For, in contrast to Western proclamations, sanctions do harm the civil society while cementing the position of hardliners. Iran’s middle class as a result will be affected by this further isolation of the country as sanctions punish honest traders and reward corrupt ones. The Guardians with their assumed 60 harbors at the Persian Gulf control the bulk of imports and sanctions will only bolster the trend of flourishing “black channels”.

One might indeed argue that the not-so-unconscious “collateral damage” of never-ending sanctions is any meaningful transition to more democracy in Iran – a prospect which would set an uncomfortable precedent for the West’s authoritarian friends in the region.

What next: “Surgical strikes” or serious diplomacy?

At the very least, the unending story of sanctions bears testimony to Western leaders’ commitment to uphold “credibility” in the face of adverse conditions as much as to imposing their will on Iran. A futile exercise – even a dangerous one – if one begins to contemplate the aftermath of “smart sanctions” being imposed: Will the next desperate move entail “surgical strikes”?

Instead of going on believing that sanctions will one day develop their desired effects, it is high time to put the brakes. Hence, the only way forward would be to adopt a set of policies that would disarm hardliners of all sides whose business flourishes in the vicious cycle of enmity. It is only by détente that grist to the mills of radicalism can be removed – and a sustainable de-militarization of Iranian politics attained. Revoking existing sanctions on goods for civilian use could work wonders that would shake the very fundaments of confrontational postures.

Despite all frivolous claims, the diplomatic route has not been exhausted. Indeed, we are far from it. Since the core problem remains the “security dilemma” in the region, it would be wise for the West to call upon Israel to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The transatlantic “coercive strategy” vis-à-vis Iran – as it is accurately described in Diplomatic Studies – must be suspended for it undermines prospects for peace and development towards democracy.

SOURCE

Ali Fathollah-Nejad (2010) “Collateral Damages of Smart Sanctions on Iran“, Informed Comment, guest editorial, 12 March;

▪ republished as “Collateral Damage of Iran Sanctions“, The ColdType Reader, No. 46 (May), pp. 56–57;

▪ republished on Monthly Review Webzine, 12/03;

▪ republished on Europe’s World, 15/03;

▪ republished on Payvand Iran News, 16/03;

▪ republished on e-International Relations (e-IR), 19/04

▪ republished as “How Smart are Sanctions?“, Iranian.com, 15/03;

▪ republished as “Sanctions on Iran: What are the Implications?“, Global Research, Montreal: Centre for Research on Globalization, 16/03;

▪ abridged version published as “Collateral Damages of Smart Sanctions“, Truthout, op-ed, 23/03.

IN CZECH | “Jaké jsou důsledky sankcí na Írán?“, trans. P. Kreuz, Eastbound.cz, 17/03.

* * *

Les dommages collatéraux des « sanctions ciblées » contre l’Iran

En s’obstinant à infliger des « sanctions ciblées» à l’Iran, l’Occident assombrit les perspectives de démocratisation, de développement économique et de résolution des conflits

Le retour saisonnier, sur la scène internationale, des bellicistes a culminé début février avec l’injonction à bombarder l’Iran du « néocon » Daniel Pipes à Barack Obama « afin de sauver sa présidence ». Peu auparavant Tony Blair avait encore glissé, lors de son exposé sur les raisons ayant justifié l’intervention militaire de son pays en Irak, une phrase inquiétante : « nous sommes aujourd’hui face au même problème en Iran ». Ainsi, il a prononcé pas moins de 58 fois le nom « Iran » lors de cette allocution. La commission « Chilcot »  en Grande Bretagne, enquêtant sur les évènements liés à la guerre en Irak, a cyniquement coïncidé avec un important renforcement militaire américain dans la région du golfe Persique. Et pour finir, il a été rapporté que des centaines de bombes anti-bunker avaient été embarquées en Californie à destination de l’île de Diego Garcia dans l’océan Indien, d’où étaient parties les deux dernières attaques aériennes contre l’Irak. Tout cela a exactement coïncidé avec la poursuite de la lutte du mouvement iranien pour les droits civiques et les proclamations des hommes politiques occidentaux qu’ils soutenaient celle-là. Mais quelles preuves existe-t-il de cela ?

Contrairement à la guerre, les sanctions sont très largement présentées comme un remède nécessaire et franchement salubre, permettant de pousser un adversaire politique à changer de cap. Cependant l’évolution du conflit irano-occidental prouve que les sanctions ont pérennisé la crise plutôt que de contribuer à en sortir. En dépit de cela, les gouvernements occidentaux semblent toujours en proie à une véritable fascination pour des sanctions.

L’appel initial à des « sanctions paralysantes » s’est tu dans un premier temps l’été dernier, lorsqu’une impressionnante vague « verte » a déferlé dans les rues de Téhéran, non pas en dernier lieu par crainte de « paralyser » cette dernière. Mais aujourd’hui de telles sanctions sont sur toutes les lèvres. On accole simplement aux mesures punitives désormais envisagées des adjectifs lénifiants tels  qu’« avisées » ou « ciblées». En y regardant de plus près, on s’aperçoit qu’on prend en fait largement ses désirs pour des réalités.

Le gigantesque impact de « sanctions ciblées »

Des « sanctions avisées » seraient, prétend-on, un remède miracle pour décapiter le mal. Dans le cas iranien, le mal est désormais identifié avec le Corps des gardiens de la révolution islamique. À l’origine créés pour défendre le pays contre l’agression irakienne dans les années 80, les Gardiens se sont transformés en un conglomérat expansif socio-politico-économique auxquels on attribue un pouvoir hors pair dans la République islamique actuelle.

On maintient que les « sanctions avisées » devraient affecter de manière ciblée la position des Gardiens au sein de la structure du pouvoir iranien. On néglige cependant la conséquence logique du fait qu’une grande partie de l’économie iranienne est aux mains des Gardiens : ce sont les millions de civils et leurs familles dont le revenu d’existence est lié aux vastes secteurs de l’économie détenus par les Gardiens qui seraient avant tout atteints. On devine alors l’ampleur gigantesque d’une démarche prétendument ponctuelle de telles mesures punitives.

Les prétendues « sanctions paralysantes », qui doivent limiter en  premier lieu les livraisons d’essence à l’Iran, sont actuellement en préparation aux Etats-Unis. Dans l’attente de ces sanctions unilatérales américaines les plus grandes compagnies mondiales d’assurances ont déjà annoncé leur retrait d’Iran. De même, les principaux fournisseurs mondiaux d’essence qui couvraient encore récemment la moitié des importations iraniennes ont cessé leurs livraisons. Ceci fait monter le prix des importations d’essence de l’Iran qui doit importer presque la moitié de sa consommation à cause de ses capacités de raffinerie insuffisantes. Là encore c’est la population qui paie l’addition. Ajoutons qu’une application totale de ces sanctions impliquerait un blocus maritime, ce qui équivaudrait à un acte de guerre.

Paralyser la population civile

Ainsi des personnalités de la société civile iranienne et des économistes le soulignent, c’est la la population civile qui paie le prix des sanctions. L’économie iranienne – de la production industrielle jusqu’aux secteurs bancaire et financier – a déjà été fortement endommagée par trois décennies de sanctions. Aujourd’hui encore les entreprises ont la plus grande peine à maintenir leurs affaires, car elles doivent compter avec des restrictions dans l’approvisionnement en biens indispensables et sont souvent obligées, pour les obtenir, de payer un prix plus élevé. Les faillites et les licenciements sont une conséquence fréquente de ces difficultés et approfondissent la crise économique du pays. En outre, la communauté scientifique souffre de difficultés d’accès aux dernières conquêtes de la recherche international, tandis que le développement technique est également freiné.

Les risques que présentent les sanctions pour la société civile ont été abordé par le chef de l’opposition Mir-Hossein Moussavi : « Les sanctions n’auraient pas d’effet sur le gouvernement, elles causeraient plutôt un mal sérieux à la population […]. Nous refusons toute sanction envers notre nation », a-t-il déclaré très clairement en automne dernier. Son associé Mehdi Karroubi s’est exprimé dans le même sens dans une interview accordée au Corriere della Sera.

Un problème de fond demeure, qui n’attire guère l’attention de tous ceux qui ont succombé à la dangereuse illusion qu’ils pourraient avoir leur mot à dire dans la définition et la mise en œuvre des sanctions contre l’Iran : c’est que celles-ci sont élaborées essentiellement par le lobby pro-israélien aux Etats-Unis – l’American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) – et sont la plupart du temps soumises au Congrès pour la forme, pour être ensuite mises en œuvre par le sous-secrétaire d’Etat au terrorisme et au renseignement financier (Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence) Stuart Levey – un homme de confiance de l’AIPAC. Dans ce processus, les retombées potentielles sur le peuple iranien ne jouent pratiquement aucun rôle.

Les sanctions – qu’elles soient « paralysantes » ou « avisées » – nuisent en fin de compte à la population. Des « sanctions avisées » sont ainsi un oxymore comparable  aux « bombes intelligentes » qui sauraient prétendument ne cibler que les objectifs à détruire, au moyen de « frappes chirurgicales ». Et comme pour leurs consœurs  militaires ce sont en définitive les « dommages collatéraux» des « sanctions avisées » qui l’emportent.  Les trouver « avisées » ne peut donc être considérer que comme du pur cynisme.

Une arme politique émoussée dans le monde d’aujourd’hui

En outre, dans un monde mondialisé et de plus en plus multipolaire, les sanctions s’avèrent n’être qu’une arme émoussée, surtout lorsqu’elles visent des pays riches en réserves d’énergie. Les acteurs guidés par leurs seuls intérêts économiques ne manquent pas, trop heureux d’occuper le vide commercial ainsi créé. C’est ainsi que des firmes chinoises, russes et même américaines – agissant via Dubaï – ont largement profité du retrait des concurrents européens sous la pression de Washington.

Devenues une quasi-obsession dans les milieux politiques en Occident, les sanctions ne sont pas un remède efficace menant à la guérison, mais agissent plutôt comme un lent poison administré à la société civile iranienne et à son mouvement démocratique. Prototype de guerre économique, les sanctions conjointement avec les appels réguliers à la guerre constituent un mélange explosif. Les tambours guerriers, qui se font entendre à nouveau, battent à nouveau sur le cœur battant de la société civile iranienne.

Le développement démocratique empoisonné par les sanctions et les menaces de guerre

Contrairement à la doxa politique, les sanctions nuisent en fait à la société civile et consolident la position des faucons. La classe moyenne iranienne est touchée par cet isolement qui n’en finit pas, d’autant plus que les sanctions atteignent les commerçants honnêtes et profitent aux corrompus. Les Gardiens, qui contrôlent vraisemblablement 60 ports dans le golfe Persique, par lesquels passe l’essentiel des importations, peuvent poursuivre leurs affaires, souvent par des « canaux douteux ».

Et c’est pourquoi l’un des « dommages collatéraux » pas tout à fait caché de ces sanctions sans fin est de faire obstacle à une transition démocratique durable en Iran. En fait cette dernière représenterait un risque pour le statu quo régional, et notamment pour la stabilité des autocraties de la région, alliées de l’Occident.

Que faire ? «Frappes chirurgicales» ou une véritable diplomatie ?

L’histoire infinie des sanctions a au moins le mérite d’illustrer les tentatives quasi désespérées des dirigeants politiques occidentaux à imposer leur volonté à l’Iran : On se donne ainsi l’impression de « faire » quand même quelque chose, afin d’avoir au moins l’air « crédibles ». Une entreprise somme toute vouée à l’échec et même dangereuse. Car il est fort à craindre que dans la foulée des « sanctions avisées » l’appel aux « frappes chirurgicales » se fasse finalement rapidement entendre.

Au lieu de s’abandonner à l’espérance illusoire que les sanctions produiront l’effet souhaité dans un avenir pas trop lointain, on devrait y mettre un terme une fois pour toutes. La seule issue consisterait à avoir le courage d’une politique capable de désarmer les faucons de tous bords, dont les affaires prospèrent admirablement dans le cercle vicieux de l’animosité. Ce n’est que par une vraie politique de détente qu’on cessera de manière durable d’apporter de l’eau au moulin des radicalismes – et que l’on contribuera en prime à un renoncement durable à la politique sécuritaire en Iran. Lever les sanctions déjà existantes, qui s’en prennent souvent aux secteurs civils, pourrait faire des miracles et ébranler considérablement les fondements des acteurs qui poussent à la confrontation.

En dépit d’affirmations hâtives, la voie diplomatique est loin d’être épuisée ; bien au contraire. Une politique de détente devrait permettre de renoncer à des mesures punitives et à la menace de guerre, et au lieu de celles-là, par le biais de mesures qui créeraient un climat de confiance réciproque, permettrait une solution équitable des défis sécuritaires qui fragilisent la région. Le problème central se trouve en fait dans le dilemme de la sécurité à l’échelle régionale. L’Occident serait donc bien avisé s’efforcer résolument de contraindre Israël – puissance nucléaire majeure – au régime de non-prolifération. On devrait donc mettre fin à la « diplomatie coercitive » envers l’Iran – comme on la désigne avec pertinence dans les Études diplomatiques – car elle assombrit les perspectives de paix et celles du processus de démocratisation.

SOURCE

Ali Fathollah-Nejad (2010) “Les dommages collatéraux des « sanctions ciblées » contre l’Iran” [The Collateral Damages of “Targeted Sanctions” against Iran], À l’encontre: Revue politique virtuelle, Switzerland, 11 May;

▪ republished on Mondialisation.ca, Canada, 15/05;

▪ slightly abridged version published as Sanctions contre l’Iran, sanctions contre les Iraniens [Sanctions against Iran, Sanctions against Iranians], Mediapart, France, 14/05.

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Unkluge Kollateralschäden “smarter Sanktionen” gegen Iran

Getrübte Aussichten auf Demokratie, sozio-ökonomischer Entwicklung und Konfliktlösung, wenn der Westen weiterhin auf Strafmaßnahmen setzt

Das saisonale Aufflackern der Kriegstreiber fand ihren Höhepunkt in dem Aufruf des US-Neokonservativen Daniel Pipes an Barack Obama, Iran zu bombardieren, um seine Präsidentschaft zu retten. Kurz zuvor hatte Tony Blair – als er ausführte, wie er dabei half, den Irak zu überfallen – noch ominös bemerkt, dass „wir heute beim Iran vor dem selben Problem stehen“. Und ganze 58 Male führte er den Namen Iran im Munde. Der Chilcot-Untersuchungsausschuss in Großbritannien über die Ereignisse rund um den Irak-Krieg fiel zynischerweise mit einer beachtlichen militärischen Aufrüstung in der Region des Persischen Golfes zusammen. Zuletzt wurde gemeldet, dass hunderte Bunker brechende Bomben von Kalifornien auf die Insel Diego Garcia im Indischen Ozean verschifft wurden, von wo aus die letzten zwei Angriffe auf den Irak geflogen wurden. All dies ereignet sich inmitten der fortgesetzten Anstrengungen der iranischen Bürgerrechtsbewegung und Verlautbarungen westlicher Politiker diese unterstützungswert  zu halten. Doch gibt es Anzeichen für Letzteres?

Im Gegensatz zu Krieg werden Sanktionen weithin als notwendige, nachgerade gesunde Medizin betrachtet, mit der ein Kurswechsel beim politischen Opponenten erwirkt werden kann. Die Geschichte des Konfliktes zwischen dem Westen und Iran bescheinigt jedoch, dass Sanktionen eher die Krise am Leben hielten, als dass sie zu ihrer Beilegung beitrugen. Dessen ungeachtet scheinen westliche Regierungen eine regelrechte Faszination für Sanktionen nicht eingebüßt zu haben.

Der anfängliche Ruf nach “lähmenden Sanktionen” verstummte zunächst, als im letzten Sommer die eindrucksvolle „grüne“ Welle die Straßen Teherans bedeckte, nicht zuletzt aus der Besorgnis heraus, ebenjene zu lähmen. Heute sind Sanktionen wieder in aller Munde, nur schmücken die gutartig klingenden Adjektive „klug“ oder „gezielt“ die nunmehr angestrebten Strafmaßnahmen. Ein genauer Blick jedoch lässt hierbei eine gehörige Portion Wunschdenken zutage treten.

Gigantische Dimension „smarter Sanktionen“

„Smarte Sanktionen“, so wird behauptet, seien ein Zaubermittel, womit das Böse enthauptet würde. Im Falle Irans wird nun das Böse mit den Revolutionsgarden identifiziert. Ursprünglich zur Verteidigung des Landes gegen den irakischen Angriff in den 80er Jahren errichtet, haben sich die Garden zu einem expansiven gesellschaftlichen, politischen und wirtschaftlichen Konglomerat entwickelt, denen eine unvergleichliche Macht in der heutigen Islamischen Republik zugesprochen wird.

„Kluge Sanktionen“ sollen demnach gezielt die Position der Garden innerhalb der iranischen Machtstruktur beschädigen. Vernachlässigt wird jedoch die logische Folgerung aus der Tatsache, dass sich ein Großteil der iranischen Wirtschaft in den Händen der Garden befindet: Die in die Hunderttausende gehenden Zivilisten und ihre Familien, deren Auskommen mit den weitgefächerten Wirtschaftsbranchen der Garden verbunden ist, würden ebenso getroffen. Dies lässt die gigantische Dimension des angeblich punktuellen Vorhabens solcher Strafmaßnahmen erahnen.

So genannte „lähmende Sanktionen“, welche zuvorderst Irans Benzinzufuhr beschneiden sollen, werden in den USA derzeit auf den Weg gebracht. In Erwartung solcher unilateraler US-Sanktionen haben die weltgrößten Versicherungskonzerne ihren bereits Rückzug aus Iran angekündigt. Ebenfalls haben weltweit führende Benzinhändler ihre Lieferungen, die vor Kurzem noch die Hälfte iranischer Einfuhren abdeckten, eingestellt. Dies betrifft in empfindlichem Maße sowohl den Finanz- und Schiffssektor und verteuert die Benzineinfuhren Irans, der fast die Hälfte seines Verbrauchs importieren muss. Auch hierbei ist die Bevölkerung die Leidtragende. Hinzu kommt, dass eine vollständige Implementierung solcher Handelssanktionen eine Meeresblockade notwendig machen würde, was jedoch einem Kriegsakt gleichkäme.

Die Zivilbevölkerung lähmen

Wie Persönlichkeiten aus der iranischen Zivilgesellschaft und auch Ökonomen betonen, wird der Preis von Sanktionen von der breiten Bevölkerung getragen. Irans Wirtschaft – von der Produktion, der Landwirtschaft bis hin zum Banken- und Finanzsektor – wurde bereits durch drei Jahrzehnte Sanktionsgeschichte in Mitleidenschaft gezogen. Noch heute können Unternehmen mit Schwierigkeiten ihre Geschäfte aufrechterhalten, da sie bei der Beschaffung notwendiger Güter mit Einschränkungen zu rechnen haben und nicht selten gezwungen sind, höhere Preise zu zahlen. Des Weiteren leidet auch die wissenschaftliche Community durch den eingeschränkten Zugang zu Forschungserrungenschaften weltweit, während technologische Entwicklungen ausgebremst werden.

Die Risiken, die Sanktionen auch für die Zivilgesellschaft darstellen, hat Oppositionsführer Mir-Hossein Mussavi vergangenen Herbst in einer Erklärung zur Sprache gebracht: „Sanktionen würden nicht gegen die Regierung wirken – eher würden sie nur einem Volk ernsthaft Leid zufügen, das großes Unheil seitens seiner eigenen Staatsmänner davongetragen hat. Wir lehnen jede Art von Sanktionen gegen unsere Nation ab,“ schrieb er unmissverständlich. Ebenso äußerte sich sein Mitstreiter Mehdi Karroubi kürzlich in einem Interview gegenüber Corriere della Serra.

Unterdessen verbleibt ein grundsätzliches Problem, was kaum die notwendige Beachtung findet, vor allem von jenen, die der abenteuerlichen Illusion erliegen sind, die Ausgestaltung und Implementierung von Sanktionen mit bestimmen zu können: Iran-Sanktionen werden hauptsächlich von der American Israeli Public Affairs Committeekonzipiert, dem US-Kongress in den meisten Fällen zum bloßen Durchwinken vorgelegt und schließlich im Finanzministerium vom Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial IntelligenceStuart Levey – ein AIPAC-Vertrauter – implementiert. Im Zuge dieses ganzen Prozesses spielen die für die iranische Zivilgesellschaft potentiell schädlichen Folgen kaum eine Rolle. (AIPAC)

Sanktionen – ob “lähmend” oder “smart” – fügen letzten Endes der Bevölkerung Schaden zu. “Kluge Sanktionen” sind ebenso ein Oxymoron wie “intelligente Bomben”, welche angeblich in gezielter Manier mit „chirurgischen Schlägen“ ausschließlich die üblen Komponenten ausnehmen. Und wie ihre militaristischen Geschwister im Geiste überwiegen schließlich die „Kollateralschäden“ „smarter Sanktionen“. Diese als „klug“ zu empfinden, kann denn nur als purer Zynismus gelten.

Eine stumpfe politische Waffe in der heutigen Welt

Darüber hinaus entpuppen sich Sanktionen in einer globalisierten, zunehmend multipolaren Welt als stumpfe politische Waffe, zumal wenn sie noch auf energiereiche Länder abzielen. Zahlreich sind jene durch Profit gelenkten Akteure, die nur zu froh darüber sind, das von anderen hinterlassene Vakuum zu füllen. Somit haben bislang chinesische, russische, sogar US-amerikanische (via Dubai agierende) Firmen beträchtlich durch den allmählichen, unter Washingtoner Druck erfolgten, Rückzug europäischer Wettbewerber profitiert.

Die in manchen westlichen Politikkreisen nahezu obsessiv betrachteten Sanktionen sind keine Heilung versprechende Medizin, sondern wirken eher wie ein langsames Gift, die der iranischen Zivilgesellschaft und ihrer Demokratiebewegung zugeführt wird. Als Prototyp wirtschaftlicher Kriegsführung stellen Sanktionen gemeinsam mit dem saisonal aufflammenden Ruf nach Krieg eine gefährliche Mischung dar. Die nun wieder vernehmbaren Kriegstrommeln schlagen wieder einmal auf das pulsierende Herz der iranischen Zivilgesellschaft.

Sanktionen und Kriegsdrohungen: Gift für demokratische Entwicklung

Im Gegensatz zu politischen Bekenntnissen schaden Sanktionen der Zivilgesellschaft, während die Stellung der Hardliner zementiert wird. Irans Mittelschicht wird durch diese weitere Isolation des Landes getroffen, zumal Sanktionen ehrliche Händler bestrafen, korrupte wiederum belohnen. Die Garden, denen man die Kontrolle von 60 Häfen am Persischen Golf zurechnet, durch denen sie ein Gros der Importe abwickeln, können weiterhin auf blühende Geschäfte durch oftmals “dunkle Kanäle” setzen.

So ist der nicht ganz versteckte “Kollateralschaden” der nimmer enden wollenden Sanktionen ein nachhaltiger Übergang zu Demokratie in Iran. Letzterer würde für den Status-Quo in der Region samt seiner mit dem Westen befreundeten Autokratien ein herrschaftspolitisches Risiko darstellen.

Was nun? „Chirurgische Schläge“ oder ernsthafte Diplomatie?

Die unendliche Sanktions-Geschichte spiegelt denn auch den nahezu verzweifelten Versuch westlicher Politiker wider, im Angesicht widriger Umstände ihren Willen Iran aufzuzwingen, ihrer eigenen „Glaubwürdigkeit“ wegen doch etwas „zu tun“. Ein alles in allem vergebliches, sogar gefährliches, Unternehmen. Denn nicht zuletzt wird zu befürchten sein, dass im Anschluss an „klugen Sanktionen“, der Ruf nach „chirurgischen Militärschlägen“ nicht lange auf sich warten lässt.

Anstatt der illusorischen Hoffnung weiterhin zu erliegen, dass eines nicht allzu fernen Tages Sanktionen ihre erwünschte Entfaltung ausbreiten, müsste man ein für allemal die Bremse ziehen. Der einzige Ausweg wäre, eine Politik zu beherzigen, die in der Lage wäre, Hardliner aller Seiten zu entwaffnen, deren Geschäft in dem Teufelskreis der Feindseligkeit nur allzu gut gedeiht. Nur durch eine Entspannungspolitik kann man das Wasser auf den Mühlen der Radikalismen nachhaltig abtragen – und überdies zu einer nachhaltigen Entversicherheitlichung iranischer Politik beitragen. Existierende Sanktionen, die oft zivile Güter betreffen, aufzuheben, könnte Wunder bewirken und erheblich die Fundamente konfrontationslustiger Akteure erschüttern.

Trotz unreifer Behauptungen, hat sich der diplomatische Weg nicht erschöpft. Man ist ganz im Gegenteil noch lange davon entfernt. Zumal ein Kernproblem im regionalen Sicherheitsdilemma besteht, wäre es in der Tat wirklich klug, wenn sich der Westen ernsthaft bemühte, die Atommacht Israel an das nukleare Nichtverbreitungsregime zu binden. Die transatlantische “Zwangsdiplomatie” gegenüber Iran – wie man sie in Diplomatischen Studien zutreffend benennt – sollte somit eingestellt werden, da sie Aussichten auf Frieden und eine Entwicklung hin zur Demokratie trübt.

QUELLE

Ali Fathollah-Nejad (2010) Unkluge Kollateralschäden „smarter Sanktionen“ gegen Iran, Telepolis, 23. März;

▪ erschienen in FriedensJournal, Nr. 3/2010 (Mai), S. 6–7.

▪ auch veröffentlicht auf ZNet Deutschland, 23.03.

▪ auch veröffentlicht auf Global Research, deutsche Site, Montreal: Centre for Research on Globalization, 29.04.